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Geopolitical tensions have periodically risen in the Asia-Pacific region due to territorial 
disputes between Japan and its neighbours over the Southern Kurils (the Northern 
Territories), the Diaoyu Islands (the Senkaku islands) and Tok Islet (Tok Islet (Dokdo)/
Takeshima). There is, of course, great discrepancy between the disputes over the Southern 
Kurils, the Diaoyu Islands and Tok Islet (Dokdo) in terms of their respective origin and legal 
nature, and effective control over them, and the historical and legal grounds on which 
the disputing states rely in their claims over the disputed territories vary widely. But what 
is consensual and definite is the fact that the islands in dispute were already excluded 
from the Japanese territory under the international legal acts deciding Japanese territory 
after World War II. The paper examines and analyzes Japanese reasoning behind its claim 
over the disputed territories in terms of relevant international legal acts relating to the 
delimitation of Japanese territory after World War II.
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Introduction
the Southern Kurils refer to the four islands among a group of more than 30 islands 
and islets lying between Kamchatka peninsula of russia and Hokkaido of Japan – 
iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and a group of islands Habomai – that lie to the north of 
Japan.1 in the geopolitical language, russia calls these islands the Southern Kurils while 
Japan in its turn refers to them as the northern territories, situated on the northeastern 
coast of Hokkaido.2
on the other hand, the diaoyu islands consisting of diaoyu dao (“dao” means 
island in Chinese) and its affiliated islands are located approximately 170 kilometers 
northeast of taiwan of China and 410 kilometers northwest of the okinawa island 
of Japan (at 123° e. longitude and 23° n. latitude). the diaoyu islands consist of five 
islands (diaoyu dao/uotsuri-shima, Huangwei yu/Kuba-shima, Chiwei yu/taisho-
to, nan Xiaodao/minami-Kojima, and Bei Xiaodao/Kita-Kojima) and three rocks (da 
Bei Xiaodao/okino Kitaiwa, da nan Xiaodao/okino minami-iwa, and Fei Jiao yan/
tobise),3 among which the most disputed one being diaoyu dao. Japan in its part 
refers to diaoyu dao and its affiliated islands as the Senkaku islands.
tok islet (also referred to as dokdo), which is a group of two islets, tong islet (east 
islet) and So islet (West islet), lies 87.4 kilometers to the southeast of ullung island 
(ullungdo) in the east Sea of Korea and 157.4 kilometers to the west of oki island of 
Japan.4 in Japan, tok islet (dokdo) and ullung island are respectively called takeshima 
and utsuryo.
1  Zhaisanbek m. amanzholov & yerik B. akhmetov, Japanese-Russian Territorial Disagreements and Their 
International Legal Substantiations, 13 middle-east Journal of Scientific research 16 (2013).
2  Border and Territorial Disputes (a.J. day (ed.), 2nd ed., detroit: Gale research, 1987).
3  中华人民共和国政府关于钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿领海基线的声明, 人民日报, 11 September 2012 [declaration of 
the People’s republic of China Concerning the territorial Sea Baseline of diaoyu dao and its affiliated 
islands, People’s daily, 11 September 2012]; michael d. Swaine, Chinese Views Regarding the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands Dispute, 41 China Leadership monitor 1, 17 (2013).
4  ministry of Foreign affairs of Japan, 10 Points to understand the takeshima dispute (2014), at 2 (aug. 12, 
2020), available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000092147.pdf.
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Since the end of World War ii, Japan has persistently been asserting that the Southern 
Kurils, the diaoyu islands and tok islet (dokdo) are “inherent parts” of Japanese territory. 
the rationale behind this “inherent territories” claim is that Japan was the first to discover 
and occupy these territories, which had been terra nullius, and therefore, according to 
Japan, even when those territories are invaded by other states, Japan has the “right” 
to claim their return.
in order to support its “inherent territories” claims over the Southern Kurils, the 
diaoyu islands and tok islet (dokdo), Japan refers to a set of historical documents 
and old maps of the medieval Period as evidence for “prior occupation” approach.
as for the Southern Kurils dispute, Japan asserts that it is the “historical memory issue 
for Japan”5 and that Japan had effectual control over the four northern territories via 
such principalities as edzo, nambu and tsugaru at the end of 18th century – beginning 
of 19th century.6 in this regard, Japan cites such possessive acts as its mapping of the 
Kurils and Sakhalin islands in the 18th century.7 Japan particularly refers to 1855 treaty 
of Shimoda on trade and Borders and 1875 Petersburg treaty in order to base their 
argument that the Southern Kurils “had historically been part of their territory.”8,9
With respect to the diaoyu islands, Japan claims that the islands were “first 
discovered” in 1884 by a Japanese merchant Koga tatsushiro10 and that okinawa 
authority started substantial survey on the islands in 1885, which allegedly confirmed 
that the islands were terra nullius and had never been under the control of China. on 
the basis of the survey results, Japan passed a Cabinet decision in 1895 ruling that 
the islands should become part of Japan and ordering to set up a signpost on the 
island.11 in support of this assertion, Japan refers to relevant documents and maps.
With regard to tok islet (dokdo), Japan also contends that a variety of maps 
and documents, including inter alia the Kaisei nippon yochi rotei Zenzu (revised 
Complete map of Japanese Lands and roads, which was first published in 1779) 
5  Kazuhiko togo, Japan’s Territorial Problem: The Northern Territories, Takeshima, and the Senkaku Islands, 
the national Bureau of asian research, 8 may 2012 (aug. 12, 2020), available at https://www.nbr.org/
publication/japans-territorial-problem-the-northern-territories-takeshima-and-the-senkaku-islands/.
6  北海道の新歴史 [New History of Hokkaido] (Hokkaido: Governorate Press, 1937).
7  amy B. Quillen, The Kuril Islands or the Northern Territories: Who Owns Them – Island Territorial Dispute 
Continues to Hinder Relations Between Russia and Japan, 18(3) north Carolina Journal of international 
Law and Commercial regulation 633, 646 (1992).
8  togo, supra note 5.
9  treaty of Saint Petersburg (1875), Wikipedia (aug. 12, 2020), available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
treaty_of_Saint_Petersburg_(1875).
10  Jon Lunn, The Territorial Dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, House of Commons Library, Sn06475, 
20 november 2012, at 3 (aug. 12, 2020), available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157093/Sn06475.pdf.
11  尖閣诸岛の领有"についての基本见解， 日本外务省， 8 march 1972 [Basic Position on territorial Sovereignty 
over Senkaku/diaoyu islands, Japanese ministry of Foreign affairs, 8 march 1972] (aug. 12, 2020), 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/senkaku/index.html.
HUI-CHOL PAK, HYE-RYON SON 33
confirm that Japan has long recognized the existence of tok islet (dokdo).12 more 
importantly, Japan cites the Cabinet decision dated 28 January 1905 and the official 
instruction of Shimane Prefecture of 22 of February 1905 ruling that tok islet (dokdo) 
should become part of Japan.13
territorial disputes surrounding the Southern Kurils, the diaoyu islands and tok islet 
(dokdo) have been, for the most part, “document warfare” and “map warfare” as Japan 
mostly rely on historical records to justify its “inherent territories” claim. Japan’s biased 
reliance on historical grounds seems to be related with its awareness of effects of 
international legal acts that might turn out to be detrimental to its territorial claim.
But the consequences of “document warfare” and “map warfare” actively con-
ducted by Japan seems to turn unfavorably to itself as neighbors against which Japan 
is in territorial disputes refer to more impeccable and decisive historical, geological 
and legal grounds regarding the Southern Kurils, the diaoyu islands and tok islet 
(dokdo).
in rebuttal to the position of Japan, russia argues that history shows russia’s 
priority in discovering and exploration of the Kurils and the Japanese never had 
effective control over the island closest to them, Hokkaido, much less the disputed 
islands in the Kuril chain.14 as evidence, russia presents an official map published in 
1796 by the government of the russian empire during the reign of Catherine ii and 
the decree of Catherine ii to the Senate in 1779 “on exemption from duties of the 
Population of the Kuril islands that Have acquired russian allegiance.”15 moreover, 
russia considers that treaties of 1855 and 1875 do not have any modern value since 
russia’s territorial concession to Japan under the two treaties were done in that 
period as a result of coercion of Japan.16
on the other hand, in opposition to Japan’s claim over the diaoyu islands, China 
released a number of historical records confirming China’s prior occupation of the 
diaoyu islands, including the military map for Chinese Coast Guard, on which 
diaoyu dao and its affiliated islands are inscribed as the diaoyu islands under 
Chinese Jurisdiction. the map was issued in 1562, 333 years earlier than 1895, when, 
according to Japan’s assertion, Japan first discovered and incorporated the islands. 
China argues that the fact that China has long recognized its sovereignty over the 
diaoyu islands is also confirmed by a number of maps produced by foreigners such 
as a map created in 1809 by a French geologist Pierre Lapie.17
12  10 Points to understand the takeshima dispute, supra note 4, at 5.
13  김정세 등, 《독도는 조선민족의 고유한 령토이다》 [Jong-Se Kim et al., Tok Islet is Part of Sacrosanct Territory 
of the Korean Nation] 239–243 (Pyongyang: Kim il Sung university Publishing House, 2010).
14  Quillen 1992, at 646.
15  Полевой Б.П. Первооткрыватели Курильских островов [Boris P. Polevoy, Explorers of the Kuril Islands] 
178–179 (yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Far eastern Book Publishing House, 1982).
16  amanzholov & akhmetov 2013, at 18.
17  郑海麟, 钓鱼岛列屿之历史与法理研究 [Hailin Zheng, Study on the History and Legal Theory of the Diaoyu 
Islands] 99–102 (Beijing: Zhonghua Bookshop, 2007).
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as for tok islet (dokdo), a numerous old documents and maps confirm that it 
is indisputably an inherent part of Korean territory, not that of Japanese territory. 
Historical records such as “Koryosa” (History of Korea) shows that tok islet (dokdo) had 
already become part of Korean territory in 512. the map of eight Provinces of Korea 
produced in 1530 and a large number of subsequent maps confirm that tok islet 
(dokdo) has long been recognized as part of Korean territory. this is also made clear 
by numerous maps created by Japanese and europeans in the end of 18th century.18
the aforementioned facts indicate that Japan’s “inherent territories” approach 
is highly disputable.
Whilst it is true that historical documents and maps are of certain significance 
in the resolution of territorial disputes over a given area, the historical records, 
as evidence for confirming the facts of the past, seem to be less relevant to the 
legal determination of national jurisdiction over disputed territories. in addition, 
“document warfare” and “map warfare” are, in essence, wars of words, which cannot 
be deemed as valid grounds for determining territorial sovereignty.
in this light, the so-called “inherent territories” approach of Japan seems to be 
no more than a general term that anyone can use with regard to disputed territories 
and a term that “cannot be accurately defined” – it is, in no case, a technical term of 
international law.19
in modern international society, territorial jurisdiction is, for the most part, 
determined by written rules of international law, including international treaties. 
Since traditional custom is somewhat uncertain and unstable, reliance on it alone 
cannot clearly determine national jurisdiction over the disputed islands. Whatever 
legends on the past Japan may create, it cannot veil the truth of national jurisdiction 
determined by modern international law provisions.
in the light of the above, the paper examines the acceptability of Japan’s territorial 
claim over the Southern Kurils, the diaoyu islands, and tok islet (dokdo) in terms 
of international treaties that were legitimately adopted at the end of World War ii. 
on the basis of analysis of preceding literature of several international academics 
and practitioners, the paper focused on clarifying that the Southern Kurils, the 
diaoyu islands and tok islet (dokdo) were excluded from Japanese territory under 
legitimately-adopted international law provisions before or after World War ii.
Sections 1, 2, and 3 will argue that the Southern Kurils, the diaoyu islands and 
tok islet (dokdo) were excluded from the post-war territory of Japan under the Cairo 
declaration, the yalta agreement and the Potsdam declaration, which was reaffirmed 
by the San Francisco Peace treaty. Section 4 will provide concluding remarks.
18  Kim et al. 2010, at 162–235.
19  佐藤優, “解説 外務省が公開しない多数の秘密文書”、松本俊一『日ソ国交回复秘録』 [masaru Sato, 
Commentaries on a Number of Confidential Documents Not Released by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Secret Records Concerning Restoration of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and USSR] 274, 
274–275 (tokyo: asahi Shimbun, 2012); 豊下楢彦 『「 尖閣問題」とは何か』 [narahiko toyoshita, What 
Is the “Senkaku Problem”?] 150–151 (tokyo: iwanami Shoten, 2012).
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the sources cited in the present research include academic literature, journal 
and newspaper articles, etc.
1. Japanese Territory Defined by the Cairo Declaration,  
the Yalta Agreement, and the Potsdam Declaration  
After World War II
the Cairo declaration of 1 december 1943, the yalta agreement of 11 February 
1945, and the Potsdam declaration of 26 July 1945 are of paramount significance 
in defining the territory of Japan after World War ii.
nevertheless, Japan attempts to negate the international legal character of 
the above treaties to claim their territorial sovereignty over the islands in dispute. 
arguments put forward by Japan can be classified into three categories. one is that 
relevant treaties are not legally binding upon Japan since the government was not 
a party to them at the time.20 another argument is that the treaties did not specifically 
name the islands from which Japan should be expelled.21 the other argument is that 
Japan did not know about one of those treaties (yalta agreement) at all.
the Cairo declaration adopted as a joint declaration of the three allied powers – 
the u.S., the uK, and China – is not per se binding upon Japan. Later, the Cairo 
declaration was incorporated into article 8 of the Potsdam declaration before the 
surrender of Japan. the Potsdam declaration, which was adopted by the u.S., the 
uK, and China as a joint declaration and to which russia subsequently acceded, did 
not have any immediate binding force on Japan at the time, either. However, the 
Japanese emperor made public announcement in which Japan accepted the Potsdam 
declaration on 14 august 1945 and signed the act on Capitulation in which Japan 
unconditionally accepted the terms of the Potsdam declaration on 2 September 
1945.22 it was this subsequent express announcement of intention by Japan that 
rendered the Cairo and Potsdam declarations binding upon the country, and thus, 
Japan thereby assumed international obligations regulated in the declarations.
the argument of Japan that it has title to the disputed territories since the Cairo 
and Potsdam declarations did not specifically name the islands from which Japan 
should be expelled seems far from acceptable. this is because the Cairo and Potsdam 
declarations merely defined the range of territories of a vanquished nation, Japan, 
without elaborating in detail on every individual island or islet.
if one reverses Japan’s reasoning that failure to specifically name the islands in 
dispute to be returned by Japan to the neighbors gives Japan title to the disputed 
20  Quillen 1992, at 650.
21  Border and Territorial Disputes, supra note 2, at 344; Friedrich Kratochwil et al., Peace and Disputed 
Sovereignty: Reflections on Conflict over Territory 67 (Lanham, m.d.: university Press of america, 1985).
22  act of Japan’s Surrender, 2 September 1945, ibiblio (aug. 12, 2020), available at http://www.ibiblio.
org/pha/war.term/093_03.html.
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islands, it leads to the conclusion that failure to specifically name the islands to be 
part of Japan’s territory will give neighboring states title to the disputed islands.
Similarly, the assertion of Japan that it is not bound by the yalta agreement 
since Japan did not know of the yalta agreement when it signed the instrument of 
surrender, nor was the yalta agreement mentioned in the Potsdam declaration which 
Japan accepted at its surrender23 lack legal grounds. it is true that the yalta agreement 
was kept confidential vis a vis Japan at that time since it dealt with the former Soviet 
union’s participation in the war against Japan. in fact, the yalta agreement was 
a contemporary wartime agreement, which carried more weight than the earlier 
Cairo declaration.24
in addition, the facts that Japan was not a third party of the yalta agreement but 
an enemy state of World War ii and that it signed an unconditional surrender lead 
to the conclusion that the yalta agreement should be considered binding upon 
Japan. therefore, it follows that the yalta agreement definitely qualifies as a binding 
international treaty.
then, how was Japanese territory delimited after World War ii according to the 
Cairo and Potsdam declarations, and the yalta agreement?
regarding the definition of post-war Japanese territory, the Cairo declaration 
stated that
Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she seized or 
occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the 
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as manchuria, Formosa, and the 
Pescadores, shall be restored to the republic of China. Japan will also be expelled 
from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.25,26
this provision in the Cairo declaration was incorporated in paragraph 8 of 
the Potsdam declaration stating that “the conditions of Cairo declaration will be 
executed,” which was accepted by Japan at its surrender,27 thus rendering the Cairo 
declaration valid as a binding international law.
regarding the areas which Japanese sovereignty will be limited to, paragraph 
8 of the Potsdam declaration specifies that “the conditions of Cairo declaration 
will be executed and that the Japanese sovereignty will be limited to the islands of 
23  tim Johnson, Disputed Territories Shrouded in Muddled History, Japan economic newswire, 13 april 
1991, available at Lexisnexis Library; Border and Territorial Disputes, supra note 2, at 339.
24  Id.
25  Cairo Conference of 1 december 1943, avalon Project (aug. 12, 2020), available at http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/wwii/cairo.asp.
26  the Cairo declaration, 27 nov. 1943, uS.-uK.-P.r.C. excerpt reprinted in John J. Stephan, The Kuril 
Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific 240 (new york: oxford university Press, 1974).
27  amanzholov & akhmetov 2013, at 19.
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Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and less larger islands” which will be specified 
by the allies.28
territories excluded from Japanese sovereignty under the Cairo declaration and 
reaffirmed by the Potsdam declaration, can be classified into three categories.
the first category includes all the islands in the Pacific that Japan seized or 
occupied since the beginning of World War i. to be more specific, the islands in 
the Pacific that Japan is obliged to return refer to the groups of islands in the 
southwest Pacific. during World War i, in 1914, Japan declared war against Germany 
and occupied groups of islands in the southwest Pacific, which it placed under its 
mandatory rule after the war. the islands in the Pacific over which the League of 
nations approved Japan’s mandatory rule were the Caroline islands, the mariana 
islands and the marshal island.29 now these groups of islands are no longer under the 
mandatory rule of Japan. the islands at issue – the Southern Kurils, diaoyu islands 
and tok islet (dokdo) – do not fall below this category of territories.
the second category of territories excluded from Japanese sovereignty under 
the Cairo declaration and reaffirmed by the Potsdam declaration, include all the 
territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese after Sino-Japanese War of 1894–
1895, such as manchuria, taiwan (Formosa), and the Pescadores. the diaoyu islands 
is affiliated to taiwan, and therefore they are included in the territories that have 
to be returned to Japan according to the declarations. Japan, however, asserts that 
the diaoyu islands are not affiliated islands of taiwan. Furthermore, Japan argues 
that the diaoyu islands could not have been included in the treaty of Shimonoseki 
since it had already incorporated the diaoyu islands into its territory by adopting 
a Cabinet decision of January 1895.30 according to Japan, the diaoyu islands do not 
belong to the territories Japan stole from the Chinese after the Sino-Japanese War, 
and therefore cannot be returned.
this claim of Japan does not seem sustainable in historical terms. Before Japan’s 
Cabinet decision of 14 January 1895, the diaoyu islands had already been recognized 
as an inseparable part of Chinese territory; it was not a terra nullius. Having been 
aware of this fact, Japan could not make the Cabinet decision open to the public and 
was unable to execute the instruction of 21 January 1895 ordering the installment 
of a signpost for marking Japanese jurisdiction over the diaoyu islands. Several 
decades later, in 5 may 1969, Japan was able to erect the signpost on the island.31 this 
28  Paragraph 8 of the Potsdam declaration (1945).
29  George H. Blakeslee, The Mandates of the Pacific, 1(1) Foreign affairs 98 (1922).
30  marta Hermez, Sino-Japanese Relations: The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute – Sovereignty, Maritime 
Delimitation and Resource Rights, thesis in Public international Law, Faculty of Law, Ghent university 
(2014), at 29 (aug. 12, 2020), available at https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/ruG01/002/162/997/ruG01-
002162997_2014_0001_aC.pdf.
31  管建强, 《国际法视角下的 中日钓鱼岛领土主权纷争》 [Jianqiang Guan, Territorial and Sovereign Disputes over 
the Diaoyu Islands Under the Scrutiny of International Law] 129 (Beijing: Chinese Social Science, 2012).
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indicates that the diaoyu islands were not ceded to Japan according to the peace 
treaty as taiwan was, but was coercively incorporated to Japan at the point of time 
when “victory” of Sino-Japanese War was certain. a Japanese scholar supports this 
view as well. He considers that Japan stole the diaoyu islands from China without 
any treaty negotiations taking advantage of victory in war.32 all these coalesce to 
indicate that the diaoyu islands fall within the category of territories Japan stole from 
the Chinese, and therefore should be returned to China after World War ii.
the third and final category of territories excluded from Japanese sovereignty, 
under the Cairo declaration and reaffirmed by the Potsdam declaration, consist of 
all other territories which Japan had taken by violence and greed. incorporating 
a paragraph to that effect, the drafters of the declarations probably intended to make 
Japan return all the territories it had taken by every possible means and ways from 
other countries. under this provision, Japan assumed obligation to unconditionally 
return territories of other countries which it had taken by violence and greed. this 
obligation is not confined to the territories taken since the beginning of World War i. 
the Cairo and Potsdam declarations were international instruments providing rights 
and obligations of allied Powers vis a vis their enemy state, Japan. Since the former 
Soviet union and Korea belong to the allied Powers, the two states had legitimate 
rights to have their territories that Japan had taken by violence and greed returned 
under the declarations.
the Kuril islands were obviously part of the Soviet union/russia’s territory 
Japan had taken by violence and greed. the treaty of Shimoda (7 February 1855), 
defining the Southern Kurils as belonging to Japanese territory by drawing a national 
boundary between iturup and urup, and the treaty of St. Petersburg (7 may 1875), 
bringing all the Kuril islands into Japanese possession are invalid since they were 
concluded in that period as a result of coercion of Japan. moreover, these treaties 
were dissolved by Japan itself as a result of an armed attack on russia and the 
signing of the Portsmouth Peace treaty in 1905. Some Japanese scholars support 
this interpretation as well.
as far as tok islet (dokdo)’s concerned, ten years after Japan stole the diaoyu 
islands from the Chinese, in 1905, Japan followed the same scenario as it had stolen 
the diaoyu islands to steal tok islet (dokdo), an inherent part of Korean territory. Since 
512, when Korea incorporated tok islet (dokdo) into its territory, the government 
has been continuously exercising its sovereignty and control over the island without 
once giving up its territorial sovereignty over it. in 25 october 1900, the Korean 
government promulgated a royal ordinance reaffirming Korean sovereignty over tok 
islet (dokdo), and expressly declared it both home and abroad through official gazette 
and legation of foreign states in Korea. nevertheless, 5 years later, on 28 January 1905, 
32  井上清，尖閣“列島-----釣鱼諸島の史的解明 [Kiyoshi inoue, Historic Account for Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands] 
118–123 (tokyo, 1996).
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Japan issued a Cabinet decision regulating that tok islet (dokdo) should be part 
of Japanese territory and on 22 February that year, issued an official instruction of 
Shimane Prefecture to that effect. But Japan could not at the time publicly announce 
the adoption of the decision and the official instruction to the international society. 
this seems to indicate that Japan was reluctant to let other countries know about 
its incorporation of tok islet (dokdo).33 the year 1905, when Japan officially issued 
documents claiming its sovereignty over tok islet (dokdo) was the period when 
Japanese colonial rule over Korea was established. therefore, it can be argued that 
tok islet (dokdo) definitely falls within the category of territories which Japan had 
taken by violence and greed.
the yalta agreement provided the transfer to the former Soviet union of the 
southern part of Sakhalin island and all the islands adjoining to it, as well as the 
Kuriles so that the rights of russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 
1904 could be restored.34 as discussed earlier, Japan is obliged to be bound by the 
yalta agreement as it is a legally binding international treaty.
in light of the aforementioned, it can be said that Japan’s assertion that the 
territories at issue fall outside the category of territories which Japan had taken 
by violence and greed lacks legal ground. the Cairo declaration, the Potsdam 
declaration and the yalta agreement are basic international instruments which 
defined Japanese sovereignty after World War ii and according to which the Southern 
Kurils, the diaoyu islands and tok islet (dokdo) are respectively recognized as part 
of russia, China and Korea, and not those of Japan.
2. Japanese Territory Determined by the Supreme Commander  
for the Allied Powers Instruction Note No. 677
Since the General Headquarters for the Supreme Commander for the allied Powers 
was a lawful and legitimate organ established after World War ii under international 
law at the time, all the documents or instructions it issued were undoubtedly valid 
under international law. one of the major functions of the General Headquarters 
for the Supreme Commander for the allied Powers was to enforce international law 
provisions, including declarations and agreements adopted during World War ii. 
to that end, the General Headquarters for the Supreme Commander for the allied 
Powers issued a set of directives to technically deal with determination of Japanese 
territories based on the Cairo and Potsdam declarations.
the most typical directive is Supreme Commander for the allied Powers instruction 
note (SCaPin) no. 677, which expressly listed the Southern Kurils, the diaoyu islands 
and tok islet (dokdo) as the areas excluded from Japanese national jurisdiction.
33  Kim et al. 2010, at 239–243.
34  the Crimean Conference of 4–11 February 1945.
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in order to define post-war Japanese territory based on the Potsdam declaration, 
which provided that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, 
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine,” the General 
Headquarters for the Supreme Commander for the allied Powers commenced its work to 
distinguish islands that had originally been part of other countries’ territories from those 
of Japan among a number of small islands scattered between Japan and its neighbors.35 
as a result of months of survey, the General Headquarters for the Supreme Commander 
for the allied Powers issued SCaPin no. 677 entitled “Governmental and administrative 
Separation of Certain outlying areas from Japan” on 29 January 1946.36
Paragraph 3 of SCaPin no. 677 provides that
3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the 
four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and 
the approximately 1 000 smaller adjacent islands, including the tsushima 
islands and the ryukyu (nansei) islands north of 30° north Latitude (excluding 
Kuchinoshima island); and excluding (a) utsuryo (ullung) island, Liancourt 
rocks (tok islet/dokdo/take island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) island, (b) 
the ryukyu (nansei) islands south of 30° north Latitude … and (c) the Kurile 
(Chishima) islands, the Habomai (Hapomaze) island Group (including Suisho, 
yuri, akiyuri, Shibotsu and taraku islands) and Shikotan island.37
Paragraph 4 of SCaPin no. 677 stipulates that further areas excluded from the 
governmental and administrative jurisdiction of Japan are the following: (a) all Pacific 
islands that were seized or occupied by Japan since the beginning of the World War 
in 1914, (b) manchuria, Formosa (taiwan), and the Pescadores, (c) Korea.38
the above-seen provisions of SCaPin no. 677 expressly excluded from Japanese 
territories the Southern Kurils and tok islet (dokdo or Liancourt rocks), and taiwan 
(Formosa) thus concurrently excluding its affiliated islands, the diaoyu islands as well.
SCaPin no. 677 plainly excluded tok islet (dokdo), ullung island and Jeju island 
(Chejudo) from Japanese territory and defined them as islands to be returned to Korea. 
this seems to confirm that the General Headquarter for the Supreme Commander for 
the allied Powers acknowledged, through months of survey, that tok islet (dokdo) 
had originally been under national jurisdiction of Korea, and that they deemed it 
conformable to the terms of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations to exclude them 
from Japanese territory and return to Korea.
35  Kim et al. 2010, at 253.
36  General Headquarters of Supreme Commander for allied Powers instruction note, Governmental and 
administrative Separation of Certain outlying areas from Japan, 29 January 1946 (aug. 12, 2020), 
available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/SCaPin677 [hereinafter SCaPin no. 677].
37  Id. para. 3.
38  Id. para. 4.
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SCaPin no. 677 reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo declaration, the Potsdam 
declaration and the yalta agreement by excluding the Southern Kurils, including 
Habomai and Shikotan from Japanese territory.
Japan interprets the meaning of “Kuril islands” differently from russia. according 
to the russian view, the clear understanding at the time was that the term included 
the disputed islands. Japan argues that the two treaties in 1855 and 1875, affecting 
only the control of the islands north of the northernmost disputed island of etorofu, 
show that the “ordinary meaning” of Kuril islands at the time only included those 
islands from uruppu north to the Kamchatka peninsula of mainland russia.
Some scholars argue that the language of 1946 SCaPin no. 677 suggests that 
the allied Powers, including united States considered Kunashiri and etorofu as part 
of the Kurils, but not Shikotan and the Habomais.39
in geopolitical light, Habomai and Shikotan are generally perceived as belonging 
to the Kuril islands, and the Southern Kurils apart from these two islands cannot be 
thought of. even if Habomais and Shikotan were to be excluded from the Southern 
Kurils, these two islands had already been excluded from Japanese territory under 
SCaPin no. 677.40
the fact that SCaPin no. 677 listed Habomais and Shikotan as well as Kuril islands on 
the same level seems to manifest that the drafters might have intended to emphasize 
the legal status of those two islands to be returned to russia given Japan’s obstinate 
claim over them at the time.
on the other hand, although SCaPin no. 677 did not specifically name the 
diaoyu islands, it can be interpreted as excluding the diaoyu islands from Japanese 
territory since it excluded taiwan (Formosa) from governmental jurisdiction of Japan. 
as mentioned earlier, in geopolitical terms, the diaoyu islands are affiliated to taiwan 
and were undoubtedly recognized as part of Chinese territory in accordance with 
not only SCaPin no. 677 but also the Cairo and Potsdam declarations.
as it is, SCaPin no. 677 is an international instrument that expressly excluded 
the Southern Kurils, the diaoyu islands and tok islet (dokdo) from Japanese territory 
and it has substantial binding force upon a defeated nation, Japan.
However, tokyo argues that SCaPin no. 677 cannot be considered as a valid 
instrument ultimately determining the return of the Southern Kurils, the diaoyu 
islands because paragraph 6 stated that
nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of allied policy 
relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in 
article 8 of the Potsdam declaration.41
39  Quillen 1992, at 652–653.
40  Kratochwil et al. 1985, at 67; see SCaPin no. 677, supra note 36.
41  SCaPin no. 677, supra note 36, para. 6.
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in light of other paragraphs of SCaPin no. 677, Japan’s position is untenable. 
at the time of drafting, paragraph 6 aimed at leaving room for further amendment 
so that if any of the allied powers put forward different proposals, the definition of 
Japanese territory could be amended. this is explained by paragraph 5 specifying 
that the definition of Japan included in the present directive will apply to all other 
future directives, memorandums, and orders issued by the present allied General 
Headquarters except otherwise defined by special directives.42 therefore, it can be 
inferred from paragraph 5 that when the definition of Japanese territory is to be 
amended, the allied General Headquarters should necessarily issue other SCaPins 
regarding the definition of Japan; otherwise, the definition of Japan regulated by 
SCaPin no. 677 will not cease to apply in the future.
if, as claimed by Japan, SCaPin no. 677 was not a final determination regarding 
the return of the islands at issue because of the language in paragraph 6, the General 
Headquarters for the Supreme Commander for the allied Powers would have issued 
other special directives specifying the incorporation of those islands to Japan. But 
no special directives had ever been issued regarding the alteration of the definition 
of Japan until the General Headquarters for the Supreme Commander for the allied 
Powers was dissolved in 1952.
the foregoing seems to confirm that the Southern Kurils, the diaoyu islands 
and tok islet (dokdo) were lawfully excluded from Japanese territory under SCaPin 
no. 677 of 29 January 1946 and reaffirmed as parts of respective countries.
in view of the fact that Japan denies the definition of Japan specified in SCaPin 
no. 677, it is preferable to reexamine the legal status and effect of SCaPin no. 677. 
the legal effect of SCaPin no. 677 was originated from the Potsdam declaration, 
the memorandum of allied powers calling upon Japan to surrender, and the 
instrument of Surrender. after the Potsdam declaration was adopted on 26 July 
1945, the former Soviet union, China, the u.S. and the uK issued a memorandum 
calling upon Japan to surrender and calling upon all governmental bodies of Japan, 
including Japanese emperor to obey the orders of the allied Supreme Commander.43 
accordingly, paragraph 6 of the act of Surrender signed by the Japanese Foreign 
minister and the Chief of the General Staff on behalf of Japan prescribed that the 
emperor and the Government of Japan should officially announce that they would 
faithfully implement the provisions of the Potsdam declaration and all orders and 
measures required by the Supreme Commander for the allied Powers and other 
allied representatives.44 Paragraph 8 of the act of Surrender specified that the 
42  Id. para. 5.
43  Quillen 1992, at 637; 中苏美英四国对日本乞降照会的复文，王绳祖，何春超，吴世民编选, 国际关系史资料
选编（17世纪中叶–1945） [Response to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender of the Four Powers: China, the 
Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom in Selection of the History of International Relations: 
17th Century – 1945] 898 (S. Wang et al. (eds.), Beijing: Law Press, 1988).
44  《日本投降书》 [Japanese Instrument of Surrender] in Id. at 903.
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emperor and power organs of Japanese Government should obey the Supreme 
Commander for allied Powers, who were responsible to take appropriate measures 
to enforce the terms of surrender.45
thus, the General Headquarters for the Supreme Commander for the allied Powers 
was competent to take all appropriate measures necessary for the enforcement of 
the terms of surrender and Japan was obliged to unconditionally obey them.
therefore, SCaPin no. 677, which was adopted for the implementation of the 
Potsdam declarations according to the act of surrender, validly defined Japanese 
territorial sovereignty.
if fact, the San Francisco Peace treaty cannot be deemed riding over the Potsdam 
declaration or the act of Surrender of Japan in terms of relations between Japan 
and three neighbors in dispute – russia, China and Korea. this is because, as will 
be discussed below, the three neighbors were not the parties to the San Francisco 
Peace treaty, and therefore the treaty cannot bind those three countries.
it can be said in the light of the above that the Potsdam declaration and the act 
of Surrender of Japan are the basic legal instruments binding upon Japan and three 
neighbors and SCaPin no. 677, which was adopted according to those instruments, 
is the most authoritative legal act defining Japanese territory after World War ii.
3. Japanese Territory Specified  
by the San Francisco Peace Treaty
in principle, the San Francisco Peace treaty is not binding upon russia, China, 
and Korea. this is because China and Korea did not take part in the conference 
and russia refused to sign the treaty even though it took part in the conference. in 
particular, China and the dPr Korea officially denounced the San Francisco Peace 
treaty and declared respectively on 15 September 1951 and 18 September 195146 
that they do not recognize the treaty.
Given the fact that Japan refers to the provisions of the San Francisco Peace 
treaty, which has no binding force upon the three neighbors, to support its claim 
over the Southern Kurils, the diaoyu islands and tok islet (dokdo), it seems necessary 
to discuss the range of Japanese territory after World War ii by analyzing relevant 
provisions of the peace treaty.
according to the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, a treaty should be 
interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose, and if the 
45  Id. at 904.
46  周恩来外长关于美国及其仆从国家签订旧金山对日和约的声明 (18 September 1951)，田桓主编：《战后中
日关系文献集(1945-1970)》 [Statement by Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
Concluded by the U.S. and its Satellite States, 18 September 1951 in Collection of Literature on Post-War Sino-
Japanese Relations: 1945–1970] 103, 103–104 (H. tian (ed.), Beijing: Chinese Social Science, 1996).
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meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, one must have recourse to supplementary means 
of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its conclusion.47 if the San Francisco Peace treaty is interpreted in accordance with 
the above-mentioned international rules on treaty interpretation, it is not difficult 
to discern that Japanese claim over the disputed islands is indefensible.
First, Japan refers to article 2(a) of the San Francisco Peace treaty, which dealt 
with the relations between Japan and Korea. the paragraph reads,
Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, 
title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart (Jeju island), Port 
Hamilton (Komun island) and dagelet (ullung island).48
Japan argues that this paragraph confirmed that tok islet (dokdo) is part of 
Japanese territory since it listed “Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton 
and dagelet” as territories that Japan must renounce, while intentionally excluding 
tok islet (dokdo).49 With all due respect, it would be more reasonable to consider that 
the drafters of the San Francisco Peace treaty didn’t bother to list all islands of Korea 
(more than 30 islands) but just mentioned the names of three representative ones 
among them. if one follows Japan’s reasoning, all other islands which were not listed 
in the San Francisco Peace treaty would become part of Japanese territory. this makes 
no sense in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty.50 Since tok islet (dokdo) is an affiliated island of ullung island, it is proper and 
natural that the wording “Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and 
dagelet” should be interpreted as including tok islet (dokdo). thus, the interpretation 
of article 2(a) of the San Franscisco Peace treaty in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning makes it certain that tok islet (dokdo) is part of Korean territory.
taking into account the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of 
its conclusion, Japan’s claim that tok islet (dokdo) should be part of its territory for the 
San Francisco did not expressly list tok islet (dokdo) lacks legal ground. originally, tok 
islet (dokdo) had been expressly specified as part of Korean territory in the first to fifth 
travaux preparatoires of San Francisco Peace treaty drafted by the u.S. between 1947 
and 1949. However, tok islet (dokdo) was omitted from the sixth travaux preparatoires of 
San Francisco Peace treaty drafted by the u.S. in december 1949. the omission appears 
to have resulted from political conspiracy between the u.S. and Japan.51 the united 
47  arts. 31 and 32 of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties (1969).
48  art. 2(a) of the San Francisco Peace treaty (1951).
49  10 Points to understand the takeshima dispute, supra note 4, at 3.
50  Kim et al. 2010, at 259.
51  Id. at 261.
HUI-CHOL PAK, HYE-RYON SON 45
Kingdom, on the other hand, included tok islet (dokdo) in Korean territory in its first and 
second draft, which it made independently of other allied powers in 1951. on 2 may 
1951, the u.S. and the uK held a joint meeting to negotiate and reach a compromise 
between the travaux preparatoires of the two states. Consequently, a compromise draft 
was made, in which tok islet (dokdo) was included in neither Korean nor Japanese 
territory. in this regard, new Zealand declared its position that tok islet (dokdo) should 
be specified as Korean territory.52 as is manifested by the above, the attempt of Japan 
to compromise with the u.S. over tok islet (dokdo) was thus checked and rebuffed by 
other allied powers, including the u.K. and new Zealand.
the fact that the San Francisco Peace treaty did not specifically include tok islet 
(dokdo) in Japanese sovereignty can be viewed as reaffirming the validity of the 
preceding international legal acts under which Korean sovereignty over tok islet 
(dokdo) was already recognized.
Secondly, let’s consider some provisions of the San Francisco Peace treaty providing 
territorial relations between Japan and China. article 2(b) stipulates, “Japan renounces 
all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores” and article 3 specifies
Japan will concur in any proposal of the united States to the united nations 
to place under its trusteeship system, with the united States as the sole 
administering authority, nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the 
ryukyu islands and the daito islands) ... Pending the making of such a proposal 
and affirmative action thereon, the united States will have the right to exercise 
all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the 
territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.53
in this connection, Japan argues that the diaoyu islands are excluded from taiwan 
renounced by Japan under article 2(b), and, in particular, the diaoyu islands should 
become part of Japanese territory under article 3 providing nansei Shoto islands 
south of 29 north latitude be placed under the administrative authority of the u.S. 
since at that time the diaoyu islands were included in the nansei Shoto islands.54
this position of Japan that the diaoyu islands were not included in taiwan that 
Japan renounced does not sustain in terms of treaty interpretation in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty. as mentioned 
earlier, article 2 of the San Francisco Peace treaty stipulates that Japan renounced 
taiwan and the Pescadores. in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty, taiwan should be interpreted as including all islands affiliated 
52  Kim et al. 2010, at 261–262.
53  arts. 2(b) and 3 of the San Francisco Peace treaty (1951).
54  ministry of Foreign affairs of Japan, the Senkaku islands (march 2013), at 4 (aug. 12, 2020), available 
at https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/senkaku_en.pdf.
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thereto. taiwan is the biggest island that is closest the diaoyu islands and the distance 
between them is only 90 n. mile. this is much shorter than 225 n. mile, which is 
the distance between the diaoyu islands and the okinawa, a Japanese island. it is 
international custom to affiliate small islands to the closest big island. examples of 
Japan’s practice in this regard can also be found. the Bonin islands of Japan, which 
lies the closest to the marcus island among other nearby islands – 660 n. mile – 
was recognized as affiliating the latter, thus incorporating it to Japanese territory.55 
therefore, according to international custom, the diaoyu islands should be affiliated 
to its closest big island, taiwan and the term “taiwan” in article 2 of the San Francisco 
Peace treaty should be interpreted as including the diaoyu islands.
recourse to the preparatory works of the San Francisco Peace treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion does not aid Japan in its claim over the diaoyu 
islands, either. exhaustive reading of the preparatory works of the San Francisco 
Peace treaty shows that the diaoyu islands were defined as neither Chinese nor 
Japanese territory in the first place. the draft version of the San Francisco Peace 
treaty of 5 august 1947 and 8 January 1948 provides that
Japan hereby cedes to China in full sovereignty the islands of taiwan 
(Formosa) and adjacent minor islands, including agincourt (Hoka Sho), Crag 
(menka Sho), Pinnacle (Kahei Sho), Samasana (Kasho to), Botel tobago (Koto 
Sho), Little Botel tobago (Shokoto Sho), vele reti rocks (Shichisei Seki), and 
Lambay (ryukyu Sho); together with the Pescadores islands (Hoko Sho); and 
all other islands to which Japan had acquired title within a line beginning at 
a point in 26° n. latitude, 121° e. longitude and proceeding due east to 122° 30’ e. 
longitude, thence due south to 21° 30’ n. latitude, thence due west through 
the Bashi Channel to 119° e. longitude, thence due north to a point in 24° n. 
latitude, thence northeasterly to the point of beginning.56
the diaoyu islands, which lie at 25° 44’ to 56’ n. latitude and 123° 30’ to 124° 
34’ e. longitude, was not included in the specific listing of islands to be ceded to 
China and the delineation of taiwan through latitude and longitude. as the draft 
shows, the diaoyu islands were included neither in taiwan that should be returned 
to China nor in Japanese territory. this seems to imply that the drafters of the peace 
treaty deemed it unnecessary to specifically reaffirm the national jurisdiction over 
the diaoyu islands since they had been already returned to China under the earlier 
international legal instruments.
However, the drafts of 1949 of the San Francisco Peace treaty provided that the 
ryukyu islands south of 29° n. latitude, which included the disputed diaoyu islands, 
55  Kim et al. 2010, at 258.
56  Seokwoo Lee, The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Territorial Disputes in East Asia, 
11(1) Pacific rim Law & Policy Journal 63, 124–125 (2002).
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would be under the envisioned system of the u.n. trusteeship.57 the drafts of october 
and november 1949 stipulated,
Japan hereby renounces all rights and titles to the ryukyu islands south 
of 29° n. latitude. the allied and associated Powers undertake to support 
an application by the united States for the placing of these islands under 
trusteeship, in association with articles 77, 79 and 85 of the Charter of the 
united nations, the trusteeship agreement to provide that the united States 
shall be the administering authority.58
the provisions concerning the ryukyu islands south of 29° n. latitude was 
reiterated in the draft dated 29 december 1949 and the same provision was finally 
incorporated in article 3 of the San Francisco Peace treaty. although the diaoyu 
islands was not specifically named in the San Francisco Peace treaty, the ryukyu 
islands south of 29° n. latitude, which according to article 3 were to be placed under 
the uS trusteeship, included the diaoyu islands.
article 34 of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties regulates that “a treaty 
does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”59 it 
should be noted that China has never expressly recognized the San Francisco Peace 
treaty nor has consented even implicitly. in light of such position of China, it is not in 
conformity with international treaty law to interpret the San Francisco Peace treaty 
as including the diaoyu islands in Japanese territory.
even before the San Francisco Peace treaty was concluded, manchuria, taiwan 
and the Pescadores had already been ceded to China in accordance with the Cairo 
and Potsdam declarations and the Japanese instrument of Surrender. the effect of 
these international legal instruments cannot be overridden by the San Francisco 
Peace treaty.60
Finally, provisions of the San Francisco Peace treaty concerning territorial relations 
between Japan and russia give rise to controversy. article 2(c) of the Peace treaty 
provides that
Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile islands, and to that portion 
of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty 
as a consequence of the treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.61
57  Id. at 125.
58  Id. at 125–126.
59  art. 34 of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties (1969).
60  Guan, supra note 31, at 133–134.
61  art. 2(c) of the San Francisco Peace treaty (1951).
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Japan argues that russia is not a party to the San Francisco Peace treaty62 and 
further asserts that the islands in dispute were not included into the notion of Kuril 
islands and that this treaty does not directly indicate to which state – Japan or 
russia – the specified territories are to be transferred to.63
it is observed that in terms of international treaty law, Japan’s assertion that russia has 
no sovereignty over Kuril islands because it is not a party to the treaty is unsustainable. 
the San Francisco Peace treaty spelt out Japan’s renunciation of all rights, title and claim 
to the Kuril islands. on the other hand, russia did not officially declare its opposition to 
this article of the treaty, which created rights for a third state, russia.
article 36 of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties provides that in the 
event that a right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty, its assent shall 
be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated.64 in light of this provision, the 
fact that russia was a third State of the Peace treaty cannot help Japan in its claim 
that the former has no title to the territories in dispute.
also, the assertion of Japan that the Southern Kurils, including Habomais 
and Shikotan are not included into the concept of Kuril islands and the national 
jurisdiction over these islands is not expressly provided in the San Francisco Peace 
treaty seems to have little ground in light of the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose.
regarding the “ordinary meaning” of Kuril islands, Japan argues that Habomais 
and Shikotan are not included in Kuril islands and it only includes those islands from 
uruppu north to the Kamchatka peninsula of mainland russia. tokyo refers to the 
two treaties in 1855 and 1875 to support this claim.65 in rebuttal, russia argues that 
the “ordinary meaning” of Kuril islands include not only iturup and Kunashir but also 
Habomais and Shikotan referring to the yalta agreement of 11 January 1945 and 
the Potsdam declaration of 27 July 1945 and Japanese instrument of Surrender of 
2 September 1945.66 the two disputants have different positions on the “ordinary 
meaning” of Kuril islands.
then, which position – Japanese or russian – finds support in more credible 
evidence in terms of international law? it is observed that the former falls short of 
credible and convincing evidence. the two treaties of the 19th century invoked by 
Japan had already been dissolved by Japan itself as a result of an armed attack on 
russia and the signing of the Portsmouth Peace treaty in 1905. therefore, even if 
it was recognized that Kuril islands did not include the 4 islands in dispute under 
19th century treaties, it no longer has any effect today.
62  Quillen 1992, at 652.
63  amanzholov & akhmetov 2013, at 18.
64  art. 36 of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties (1969).
65  Johnson, supra note 23.
66  act of Japan’s Surrender, supra note 22.
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it is a general principle of law interpretation that when interpreting the meaning 
of a certain term, a subsequent law overrides earlier laws providing the meaning of 
the identical term. it is, therefore, rightful to interpret the meaning of Kuril islands 
according to the international legal acts concerning russia-Japanese relations which 
were subsequently concluded after the two treaties of the 1800s Japan refers to.
When viewed from the linguistic aspect that the meaning of a given term can 
continuously change, i.e. either dwindle or expand as society develops, Japan’s 
allegation hardly seems acceptable. even though as asserted by Japan, Kuril islands 
did not include the islands in dispute in the 19th century, the meaning of the term 
may well change or expand over time.
When there is inconsistency between the meaning of a word in the past and 
that at present, the most accurate resolution would be to examine the meaning 
of the period that is closest from the point of time when inconsistency was taken 
issue. in this light, the meaning of Kuril islands should be examined on the basis of 
the international legal acts concluded just prior to the San Francisco Peace treaty, 
which led to controversies surrounding the meaning of Kuril islands.
more importantly, the purpose of the San Francisco Peace treaty was to reaffirm 
and legally determine the international legal instruments accepted by Japan, 
including the yalta and Potsdam declarations, the instrument of Surrender, and 
instruction notes of the Supreme Commander for the allied Powers. this also 
indicates that it is most reasonable to interpret the meaning of “Kuril islands” on 
the basis of these instruments. russian position that Kuril islands included all the 
Southern Kurils, including Habomais and Shikotan was reflected in the term “Kuril 
islands” specified by the yalta and Potsdam declarations, instrument of Surrender, 
and instruction notes of the Supreme Commander for the allied Powers, which 
Japan unconditionally accepted.
the yalta agreement provided that it is restoration of the rights of russia to 
transfer to the former Soviet union the southern part of Sakhalin island and all the 
islands adjoining to it, as well as the Kuril islands.67 on 2 September 1945, Japan 
signed the act of Surrender unconditionally accepting the terms of the Potsdam 
declaration defining the Japanese territory after World War ii.68 Japan thereby lost the 
right to refer to the Southern Kuril as “illegally occupied.” if Japan had had the lawful 
grounds not to consider any of the islands in dispute as Kuril islands, it would have 
declared about it at that time.69 this indicates that no real misunderstanding existed 
as to whether the treaty term, “Kuril islands,” included the disputed islands.70
67  the Crimean Conference of 4–11 February 1945.
68  act of Japan’s Surrender, supra note 22.
69  Чернявский С.В. Сан-Францисский мирный договор 1951 г. [S.v. Chernyavsky, San Francisco Peace 
Treaty (1951)] (aug. 12, 2020), available at https://rgavmf.ru/sites/default/files/lib/cherniavskiy_sf_
dogovor_1951.pdf.
70  Quillen 1992, at 644.
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the foregoing considerations indicate that Japan’s claim that the Southern Kurils, 
the diaoyu islands and tok islet (dokdo) are excluded from the territories renounced 
by Japan under the San Francisco Peace treaty lack credibility.
Conclusion
the Cairo declaration, the yalta agreement, the Potsdam declaration, and the 
act of Surrender, which defined Japanese territory after World War ii are binding 
international treaties and international legal documents which Japan is obliged to 
abide by.
article 26 of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties provides that,
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith.71
this provision is a codification of a rule of customary international law “pacta sunt 
servanda,” which is binding upon all states. in this regard, it is an obligation under 
customary international law and vienna Convention on the Law of treaties for Japan 
to comply with the terms of international legal acts defining its territory.
it is to be deplored that in violation of its obligations under international law 
regarding territorial issues, Japan infringed Chinese territorial sovereignty over 
the diaoyu islands. and the disputes surrounding the Southern Kurils and tok islet 
(dokdo) are also aggravating tensions in the asia-Pacific region.
What should be noted in the territorial dispute between russia and Japan 
is the Joint Soviet-Japanese declaration, which was signed by the parties on 19 
october 1956 and came into force after an exchange of ratification documents on 
12 december the same year. article 2(9) set forth
[t]he union of the Soviet Socialist republics meeting half-way the wishes 
of Japan and considering the interests of the Japanese state agrees on 
assigning the islands Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, however, provided 
that the actual assignation of these islands to Japan will be made after the 
conclusion of a Peace treaty between the uSSr and Japan.72
as the provision shows, the former Soviet union declared its readiness to meet 
“the wishes of Japan,” and also to take into account “the interests of the Japanese 
state” depending on the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Peace treaty.
71  art. 26 of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties (1969).
72  Joint declaration of the Soviet union and Japan of 19 october 1956 (aug. 12, 2020), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2145323?uid=3739632&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&
uid=3739256&sid=21100737449971.
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But it is noteworthy that the Joint Soviet-Japanese declaration used the term 
“assign” instead of “return.” the implications of the two terms are quite different. Whilst 
“assignment” refers to a voluntary transfer of property or right by a lawful owner to 
others, the term “return” refers to transfer of property or right illegally acquired to 
its original owner. the use of the term “assign” instead of “return” in the Joint Soviet-
Japanese declaration implies that both parties admitted that Habomais and Shikotan 
were under russian sovereignty. in fact, the conclusion of this joint declaration 
was preconditioned by the concord of both signatories concerning the national 
jurisdiction over Kuril islands, to which Japan agreed. therefore, the envisaged 
“assignment” of the territories provided in the Joint Soviet-Japanese declaration 
should not be construed as the intention to “return” the territories “that were illegally 
occupied” by russia, but as voluntary will to transfer the islands under its own 
national jurisdiction considering “the interests of the Japanese state.” Furthermore, 
the Soviet-Japanese Joint declaration was not a “recognition of Japanese historical 
or legal rights” to the disputed territories, “but merely a ‘gesture of goodwill’ which 
in no way meant to signify a revision of the results of World War ii.”73
the Soviet-Japanese Joint declaration, under which Habomais and Shikotan 
could have been assigned to Japan, however, was revoked not long after its 
conclusion when Japan renewed its security treaty with the u.S. Japan, thus, did 
not take advantage of such a provision of the Soviet-Japanese Joint declaration.
to conclude, Japanese territory after World War ii has already been determined 
by a set of international legal instruments at the time. the recurrent frictions 
surrounding territorial disputes between Japan and its neighboring states can trigger 
destabilization of international security in the asia-Pacific region. in order to maintain 
international and regional peace and security in the asia-Pacific region, and in the 
interests of Japan itself, it is necessary for Japan to recognize the international legal 
acts of the past and to be ready to peacefully coexist with its neighboring states.
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